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RIGHT OF ACCESS:
How ONE DISABILITY LAW DISABLED ANOTHER
Scott B. Mac Lagan
INTRODUCTION
Congress has enacted several laws within the last forty years
that address the issue of discrimination against the disabled.' While
the overarching theme of these statutes is to enable disabled Ameri-
cans to achieve treatment and opportunities equal to their non-
disabled American brothers and sisters,2 for the purposes of this
Comment these laws will be categorized as either statutes whose pur-
pose is to ensure equal access to disabled Americans or statutes
whose purpose is to ensure equal educational opportunities to dis-
abled Americans. The acknowledgement of this distinction, or lack
thereof, has resulted in two federal district courts reaching opposite
conclusions on the same issue: whether a disabled student with a
service dog should be granted access to a public school.3
Surprisingly, this issue has only been presented to the courts
twice; once in the Eastern District of California in Sullivan v. Valle-
jo,4 and once in the Eastern District of New York in Cave v. East
. Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2011. I would like
to thank Professor Myra Berman for her invaluable assistance throughout the writing
process. I would also like to thank my wife, Risa, and my sons, Jonas and Ryley, for their
immeasurable patience and support.
1 Julie M. Spanbauer, Kimel and Garrett: Another Example of the Court Undervaluing
Individual Sovereignty and Settled Expectations, 76 TEMP. L. REv. 787, 804-06 (2003) (dis-
cussing the history of the disability rights movement and Congress' response and legislation,
including, Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments to the Vocational Act of 1918; Architec-
tural Barriers Act in 1968, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the American with Disabilities
Act of 1990).
2 Id. at 805.
See Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Cal. 1990); Cave
v. East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist. (Cave 1), 480 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
4 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 949.
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Meadow Union Free School District. In Sullivan, the district court
concluded that to refuse access to a student with her service dog
would violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 ("section
504").6 In Cave, the district court concluded that the plaintiff s claim
was educationally-based and, consequently, not ripe for adjudication
pursuant to the procedural requirements of the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act ("IDEA").7 In its refusal to follow Sullivan,
the district and circuit courts in Cave have set a precedent that endan-
gers the progress Congress has attained in the struggle for the protec-
tion of the rights of disabled American citizens.8
This Comment analyzes the different approaches and results
of these two cases and discusses the possible implications of the
Second Circuit's decision.9 Part I discusses the relevant statutes re-
lating to this issue, including the American with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the IDEA.'o
Part II explores the various approaches utilized by the judiciary in in-
terpreting these statutes. Part III discusses and analyzes Sullivan v.
Vallejo, an Eastern District of California case, where the court held
that the school district was required to accommodate the plaintiffs
use of her service dog at school." Part IV discusses and analyzes
Cave v. East Meadow Union Free School District, a case decided in
the Eastern District of New York and affirmed by the Second Circuit,
with particular emphasis on how both courts erred in refusing to fol-
low the precedent of Sullivan. In conclusion, this Comment discusses
the potential consequences of the Cave decision and its affect on the
present and future protection afforded by congressional legislation for
the benefit of the disabled.
Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
6 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 961.
7 See Cave 1, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 636-39.
8 See Cave v. East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist. (Cave II), 514 F.3d 240, 251 (2d Cir.
2008).
9 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. 947; Cave II, 514 F.3d at 240.
10 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. and 47 U.S.C.A.) (West 2010); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 §
504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2002); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 to 188 (codified in 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West 2010).
" Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 961.
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I. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION FOR THE DISABLED
Since 1970, when the first piece of federal legislation dealing
with the rights of the disabled was enacted, there have been several
additional statutes and amendments enacted, which address the issue
of preventing disability-based discrimination.12 Indeed, the last cen-
tury has witnessed remarkable legislation in the advancement of pro-
tecting the rights of the disabled. 13 The three federal statutes that are
relevant to the current argument are the ADA, the IDEA, and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.14 In order to interpret and ana-
lyze the application of these laws in the context of a disabled student
who wishes to utilize her service dog in a public school, it is first ne-
cessary to briefly discuss these statutes and their antecedents.
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1990, the ADA was enacted with the express purpose of es-
tablishing "a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of disability" in several specific environments.'" This
Act ensured that Americans with disabilities would receive the same
treatment as those without disabilities.' 6 One goal of the ADA, as
noted in the congressional findings of the Act itself, is to provide le-
gal recourse to redress discrimination experienced by the disabled.'"
In addition, Congress also found that some of the various forms of
discrimination that individuals with disabilities encounter are "out-
right intentional exclusion, . . . overprotective rules and policies, fail-
ure to make modifications to existing . . . practices, [and] exclusio-
nary qualification standards and criteria."' 8  On the day of the
Senate's passage of the ADA, Senator Tom Harkin, the bill's spon-
sor, stated that by enacting the ADA, "we as a society make a pledge
12 Spanbauer, supra note 1, at 804-06.
' Id.
14 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213; 47 U.S.C.A. § 225; 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-
1482; 29 U.S.C.A. § 794.
1s 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03, I (July 13, 1990).
1" Id. at 10.
17 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(4), in which Congress states that the ADA seeks to provide
the same legal recourse to the disabled as other federal civil rights laws provide to those ex-
periencing discrimination on account of their race, color, sex, national origin, religion or age.
" Id. § 12101(a)(5).
2010] 737
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that every child with a disability will have the opportunity to maxim-
ize his or her potential to live proud, productive, and prosperous lives
in the mainstream of our society."l 9 Senator John McCain added,
"[t]he ADA is a final proclamation that the disabled will never again
be excluded, never again treated by law as second-class citizens."20
Thus, it is clear that the legislative intent of the ADA was to protect
people, including children, with disabilities from being excluded
based upon overprotective rules, policies, standards and criteria, and
to provide these Americans with the ability to redress such discrimi-
nation in federal court.
Finally, in order to state a claim under the ADA, the plaintiff
must make a prima facie showing that: "(1) she is a qualified individ-
ual with a disability; (2) she was excluded from participation in or
otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity's ser-
vices, programs, or activities, and (3) such exclusion or discrimina-
tion was by reason of her disability." 21 These requirements, which
apply to all ADA claims, do not change if the plaintiff is a student
and the defendant is a school district, 22 and therefore, for the purposes
of this discussion, the ADA fits into the non-educational category of
disability laws.
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted to
prohibit disability-based discrimination by federally assisted pro-
grams and activities.23 Public schools are specifically included in the
list of 'activities' covered under this Act. 24 Under section 504, stu-
dents whose disabilities create a substantial limitation on a major life
activity, such as caring for oneself, hearing, and working, can qualify
for accommodations. 25  In an action alleging discrimination under
19 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03, 15 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
20 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03, 1 (1990) (statement of Sen. McCain).
21 See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Weinreich v. Los
Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)).
22 See, e.g., Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (requiring a student to prove all three require-
ments in order to establish an ADA claim against the school district).
23 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 26:5 (rev. 2d ed. 2009).
24 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(b)(2)(B).
25 Megan Roberts, The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act: Why Considering In-
dividuals One at a Time Creates Untenable Situations for Students and Educators, 55 UCLA
L. REv. 1041, 1056 (2008).
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section 504, the plaintiff must show that: "(1) she is handicapped
within the meaning of [section 504]; (2) she is otherwise qualified for
the benefit or services sought; (3) she was denied the benefit or ser-
vices solely by reason of her handicap; and (4) the program providing
the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance."26 If the
plaintiff satisfies each of these elements, then the burden shifts to the
defendant to refute the inference of discrimination. 27 However, if the
defendant can show that accommodations cannot reasonably be made
to enable the handicapped person to participate, then the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that an accommodation is in
fact possible or practical.28 In the following analysis, the plaintiffs, in
both Sullivan and Cave, argue that their right to a federally-funded
benefit, such as, access to a public school, has been violated based
upon their use of service dogs.29
Since section 504 and the ADA create essentially the same
rights and obligations, courts have applied the same analysis to de-
termine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief can
be granted under either Act.3 0 This analysis determines whether the
plaintiff has alleged that (1) "she is disabled under the Act, (2) she is
'otherwise qualified,' " (3) she was denied benefits or services, or
otherwise subject to discrimination, "solely because of her disabili-
ty," and (4) the defendant "receives federal financial assistance" (un-
der section 504), "or is a public entity" (under the ADA).31 Section
504 claims of the current discussion deal with disability-based dis-
crimination claims that arise solely from access to a public school-
and not with the quality of education provided by the school32 -
26 Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052.
27 Roberts, supra note 25, at 1056.
28 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 957.
29 Id. at 949 (alleging that the school, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 and
the Unruh Civil Rights Act, prevented plaintiff from bringing her service dog to school); see
also Cave II, 514 F.3d at 243 (alleging that the school violated the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 when it prevented plaintiff-student from attending school with his service
dog).
30 Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999) (indi-
cating that "courts have applied the same analysis to claims brought under both statutes").
31 Id. at 1045.
32 See id. at 1046 (demonstrating that similarly to section 504, the ADA requires "a public
entity to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the mod-
ifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public
entity can demonstrate that making the modification would fundamentally alter the nature of
the services, program or activity") (internal quotations omitted).
2010] 739
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section 504 fits into the non-educational category of disability laws.
C. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The legislative history of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act began in 1970 when Congress took the momentous
step of enacting legislation to protect the educational rights of stu-
dents with disabilities in the Education of the Handicapped Act of
1970 ("EHA").33 In 1975, Congress reauthorized the EHA as the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EAHCA").34
The EAHCA was later reauthorized as the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act of 1990 ("IDEA"), which was further reauthorized
as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
("IDEIA") of 2004.35 While these amendments have updated the
original EHA to coincide with new understandings of what consti-
tutes a disability and what is the best method of educating students
with disabilities, the legislative intent has remained the same: ensur-
ing all students with disabilities are provided with meaningful access
to learning in schools. When the IDEA was being amended in
2004, Representative Betty McCollum, of Minnesota, urged the
House members "to support this important piece of bipartisan legisla-
tion that will move us forward in our goal to provide an equal, quality
education for all students." 37 Therefore, since its primary objective
has been the protection of a disabled child's right to an education, the
IDEA fits into the educational category of disability law.
The federal government, with the passage of the EAHCA, has
required "that all states receiving federal funding for education en-
sure that students not be denied an education as a result of their han-
dicaps." 38 Although the EAHCA has been amended several times
since its enactment, none of these amendments have altered the three
basic requirements imposed upon states receiving federal funds: "(1)
that children with disabilities receive Individualized Education Pro-
grams (IEPs); (2) that schools provide to students with disabilities a
3 Roberts, supra note 25, at 1045 (discussing the struggles Congress faced over several
years from the enactment of the EHA to the enactment of the IDEA).
34 Id. at 1094 n.9.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1047-48.
3 150 CONG. REc. E2183-01, 1 (2004) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
38 Roberts, supra note 25, at 1048-49.
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free and appropriate public education (FAPE); and (3) that this edu-
cation occur in the least restrictive environment (LRE) appropriate."3 9
The precise meaning of a FAPE, as well as the meaning of
what constitutes the LRE, has yet to be agreed upon by the many
courts that have handled cases alleging violations under the EAHCA
and its progeny. 40 Generally, courts will consider: (1) whether the
"procedural requirements for the IEP have been met," (2) whether the
IEP "sets forth attainable and reasonable goals with the necessary
supplemental aids and services," (3) whether the JEP is adhered to in
the classroom setting, and (4) whether the parents were involved in
the creation of the IEP.41 The United States Supreme Court, in Board
of Education v. Rowley,42 stated that a FAPE requires that the IEP be
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational ben-
efits." 43 Several courts have used this reading of the Act as the basis
of its analysis of whether a student has been provided a FAPE in a
LRE."
In order to guarantee parents an equal opportunity to be heard
regarding disputes over whether the services provided to the student
provide a FAPE in a LRE, Congress included certain procedural sa-
feguards in the IDEA, one of which is the administrative remedy.45
Although in limited circumstances exhaustion of administrative re-
medies under an IDEA claim may be excused,46 the IDEA generally
requires exhaustion prior to bringing a civil suit based on the notion
that "the needs of children with disabilities are best accommodated
by the mutual efforts of parents and school district officials who work
together to formulate" the child's IEP.47
3 Id. at 1049 (footnote omitted).
40 See id. at 1057-58 (noting that courts have used various tests in their determinations
resulting in inconsistent interpretations leading to "unpredictable outcomes in the law").
41 Id. at 1053.
42 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
43 Id. at 206-07.
4 See Roberts, supra note 25, at 1054-55.
45 Susan G. Clark, Administrative Remedy Under IDEA: Must It Be Exhausting?, 163
EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1 (2002).
46 See Meehan v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(describing the three situations where exhaustion is not required prior to commencing a civil
action as: "(1) where it would be futile to use the due process procedures; (2) where an agen-
cy has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the
law; or (3) where it is improbable that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing adminis-
trative remedies").
47 Clark, supra note 45, at 2.
2010] 741
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However, courts have noted that if a plaintiff can articulate
some distinction between the ADA claim and the IDEA claim, then a
plaintiff may be able to avoid the IDEA's exhaustion requirement.48
For example, in Franklin v. Frid,49 the district court noted that "a dis-
abled child who asserts a constitutional claim having some relation-
ship to education but no nexus to the IDEA is not required to pursue
administrative remedies under the IDEA before filing suit under §
1983."'o Although the Franklin court found the plaintiffs claim of
verbal abuse by his teacher to have such a nexus (pointing out that
the complaint itself referred to the IDEA), the court cited several
teacher-student abuse cases which involved "acts having no relation-
ship to the appropriate education of a disabled child . . . [and there-
fore, did] not come within the purview of the IDEA."52
Thus, if a complaint alleges misconduct on the part of a school
official or school district, and the misconduct has a nexus to the edu-
cational goals of the IDEA, then the plaintiff shall be required to ex-
haust the administrative remedies of the IDEA.53 The purpose of the
administrative exhaustion requirement of the IDEA is based on the
idea that "the needs of children with disabilities are best accommo-
dated by" having the parents and the school district officials "work
together to formulate individualized plans for each" disabled child's
education. 54 Thus, when faced with a non-IDEA claim that seeks re-
lief that is educationally-based, it is wholly appropriate for the court
to impose the requirements of the IDEA. 5 However, if the relief
sought is not educationally-based and the court imposes the require-
48 See, e.g., Hoekstra v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 916 F. Supp. 941, 947-48 (D. Minn.
1996) (noting that a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA who seeks a type of relief, for ex-
ample, money damages, that is not available under the IDEA will not enable the plaintiff to
avoid the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA when the plaintiff had previously raised the
issue at bar at an IDEA hearing), aff'd, 103 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1996).
49 7 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
so Id at 925.
5 See id. (holding that "the gravamen of the claim is that Defendants deprived Craig of
his right to an appropriate public education under the IDEA").
52 Id. (citing Campbell v. Nye County Sch. Dist., No. 94-15747, 1995 WL 597706, at *2
(9th Cir. Oct. 10, 1995); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1987)).
5 See id. (noting that pursuit of administrative remedies is not required in a constitutional
claim regarding education so long as it has "no nexus to the IDEA").
54 Clark, supra note 45, at 2.
s5 See Franklin, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (indicating that the required administrative remedies
under IDEA claims are not required in other non-IDEA related educational claims brought
under the Constitution).
[Vol. 26742
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ments of the IDEA, it results in the court frustrating the purposes of
the ADA. 56 Whereas the goals of the IDEA and ADA are similar, in
that both statutes seek to protect the rights of people with disabilities,
they are not identical.57 The ADA's goal of enabling people with
disabilities to receive the same opportunities as people without dis-
abilities is distinct from the IDEA's goal of enabling students with
disabilities to receive the same educational opportunities as non-
disabled students.5 8  While this educational/non-educational distinc-
tion exists, because both categories involve protecting the rights of
the disabled, varied and inconsistent holdings by the judiciary have
resulted.59
II. THE JUDICIARY'S INTERPRETATION OF DISABILITY LAWS
While Congress has done its part in the fight against discrimi-
nation toward the disabled, American courts have been faced with a
multitude of cases in which they have had to interpret existing disa-
bility laws.60 Here, as with most areas of legislation, some decisions
of the courts have resulted in clear rules of law, while other decisions
have resulted in inconsistent and, at times, contradictory interpreta-
tions of federal statutes. 6 1 One area where this result has been com-
mon is when the courts have been asked to apply multiple laws to a
single situation, such as a discrimination suit alleging simultaneous
violations of the ADA, section 504, and the IDEA.62 When faced
56 Id. (stating that acts that do not relate to the proper education of a disabled child do not
fall within the scope of IDEA).
1 S. N.H. Univ., I.D.E.A. vs ADA/Section 504, http://www.snhu.edu/1363.asp (last vi-
sited Nov. 1, 2009) (stating that IDEA "[pirovides funding to states to ensure provision of
free appropriate public education for children with disabilities," while ADA is a "Civil
Rights statute protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination").
58 Id.
5 See, e.g., Franklin, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (deciding that it was necessary for plaintiffs to
exhaust the administrative process under IDEA); Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 951 (deciding that
"the issue of whether the service dog enhance[d] plaintiffs educational opportunities, which
is central to the EHA inquiry, is . . . irrelevant under section 504. [Therefore] plaintiff need
not exhaust the EHA administrative remedies, and defendants' motion to dismiss the federal
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be denied").
60 See Franklin, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 925; Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 951.
61 See Franklin, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 925; Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 951.
62 See, e.g., Cave II, 514 F.3d at 243 (holding that the district court did not have jurisdic-
tion over plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief under the ADA, section 504, and other fed-
eral claims since the plaintiffs "failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the
[IDEA]").
2010] 743
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with a claim involving combinations of these federal laws, courts
have wrestled with how to enforce the spirit of these laws while abid-
ing by the different requirements proscribed in the different statutes.63
For example, the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement has
resulted in courts consistently holding that, inter alia, while section
504 can be used to enforce educational rights, the administrative pro-
cedures required by the IDEA must be exhausted before relief can be
granted.64
In Gabel ex rel L. G. v. Board of Education,65 the court held
that while section 504 is designed to prohibit denial of access to an
appropriate educational program on the basis of a disability, the
IDEA is designed to remedy dissatisfaction with the content of a stu-
dent's IEP.66 While recognizing that the "IDEA and section 504 are
complementary" regarding educational obligations to children with
disabilities, the court in Gabel found that the two Acts "address dif-
ferent injuries and thus require different proof," noting that "[s]ection
504 offers relief from discrimination, whereas IDEA offers relief
from inappropriate educational placement, regardless of discrimina-
tion." 67 Therefore, the question becomes: what is the proper ruling
on a motion to dismiss if the complaint does not allege a violation of
the IDEA?
The courts have established a rule that a plaintiff cannot sides-
tep the exhaustion requirement by omitting an IDEA claim from her
complaint if the remedy sought is available under the IDEA.68 While
this conclusion has been upheld in several circuits, the Sullivan court
and the Cave courts have been presented with a slightly different is-
sue: a complaint alleging a violation of both the ADA and section
504, with a concession by the plaintiff that there has not been a viola-
tion of the IDEA. 69 The Sullivan and Cave courts have reached op-
63 See id.
6 Clark, supra note 45, at 2 (citing Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 888 F. Supp. 674 (E.D.
Pa. 1995)).
65 368 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
6 Id. at 333 (citing Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147, 152
(N.D.N.Y. 1997)).
67 Id.
68 Clark, supra note 45, at 4-5 (citing Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877 F.2d 809,
814 (10th Cir. 1989)).
61 Cave II, 514 F.3d at 243 (holding that the district court did not have subject matter ju-
risdiction over appellants' federal claims since appellants failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing suit, as required under IDEA); Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 949 (denying
744 [Vol. 26
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posite conclusions based upon each court's approach to analyzing the
plaintiffs' disabilities, their claims, and the remedies sought. 70 The
Sullivan court used an approach in which it viewed the plaintiff as a
disabled person seeking access to a public school, while the Cave
courts used the approach of viewing the plaintiff as a disabled student
seeking access to a free appropriate public education.n While on the
surface these two approaches may appear indistinguishable, they
have resulted in conflicting holdings.
III. SULLIVAN V. VALLEJO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
In 1988, Christine Sullivan, a sixteen year old student with ce-
rebral palsy, learning disabilities, and right-side deafness, obtained a
service dog from Canine Companions for Independence ("Canine
Companions") and sought permission from Vallejo City Unified
School District ("Vallejo District") to bring the service dog to
school. 72 After the Vallejo District rejected Sullivan's request, Sulli-
van filed a complaint in the Eastern District Court of California, al-
leging the Vallejo District had violated her rights under section 504
and under several state civil rights statutes.73 The Vallejo District
moved to dismiss the claim based upon the plaintiffs failure to ex-
haust available administrative remedies under the IDEA. 74 The Val-
lejo District argued that because the plaintiff could request an IEP
hearing to obtain a change in her IEP that would include the use of
her service dog, the IDEA's requirement of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies barred the district court's jurisdiction over the plain-
tiffs claim.7s
However, the district court rejected this argument and pointed
the defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs Rehabilitation Act claim for failure to exhaust
administrative measures was denied and holding that the school officials violated section 504
by not allowing the student to bring her service dog to school).
70 See Cave II, 514 F.3d at 243; Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 949.
71 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 949 (describing how defendants refused to allow a high school
student suffering from cerebral palsy to bring her service dog to school); Cave H1, 514 F.3d at
244 (defendants refused to allow a high school student suffering from hearing impairment to
bring his service dog to school because they believed he was functioning satisfactorily under
his IPE).
72 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 948-49.
7 Id. at 949.
74 id.
7s Id. at 951.
2010] 745
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out that the plaintiff had neither contended that the Vallejo District
had created an inadequate IEP, nor had she argued that the service
dog was educationally necessary.76 Rather, according to the district
court, the plaintiffs claim was that the "defendants ha[d] discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of her handicap by arbitrarily refusing
her access if she [was] accompanied by her service dog." 77 While the
district court acknowledged the importance of whether the service
dog could enhance the plaintiffs educational opportunities would be
central to the IDEA analysis, the court, nevertheless, determined it
was completely irrelevant because the plaintiff was asserting that the
defendants had discriminated against her in violation of section 504
by failing to make reasonable accommodations for her use of a ser-
vice dog.7 The district court stated that if the plaintiff could show
that the use of the service dog was "reasonably related to her disabili-
ty," then the sole issue under section 504 would be whether the de-
fendants were "capable of accommodating plaintiffs choice to use a
service dog."79  The district court concluded that since the relief
sought by the plaintiff, an order restraining the Vallejo District from
excluding her service dog, was not educationally-based, it would be
erroneous to find the plaintiffs requested relief available under the
IDEA.80 Thus, the district court held that the plaintiff was not re-
quired to fulfill the IDEA's requirement of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 1
The district court quickly found that the first and third criteria
of the section 504 claim were satisfied-Sullivan was disabled and
the school received federal funds.82 Thus, the court moved on to the
plaintiff s contention that the second element-she was discriminated
against based upon her disability-was satisfied by the Vallejo Dis-
trict's refusal to grant her access to the public school when she was
accompanied by her service dog.83 The district court refused to ac-
76 Id.
n Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 951.
78 Id
7 Id. (stating that although the defendants could not question the validity of the plaintiffs
choice to use a service dog, the defendants could exclude the dog if they could show that no
reasonable accommodations were available).
80 id.
81 id
82 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 957-58.
8 Id. at 958.
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cept the defendants' argument that there was a distinction between
refusing to grant access to the plaintiff and refusing to grant access to
the plaintiffs service dog. 84 According to the district court, the letter
and spirit of section 504 is "to increase the participation of handi-
capped persons in society" and to prohibit discrimination against the
disabled based on public perception of the person's handicap.85 To
this end, the district court stressed the importance of giving "defe-
rence . . . to the manner in which [the disabled] person chooses to
overcome the limitations [of] her disability," and therefore, "as long
as th[ose] choices . . . are reasonable, [section 504] both protects
those choices from scrutiny, and prohibits discrimination against the
disabled person on the basis of those choices."86 The district court
compared the plaintiff s choice of using a service dog to increase her
independence to the choice of using a wheelchair "rather than a pair
of crutches," and thus categorized the Vallejo District's exclusion of
the service dog as a request for "plaintiff to assume a different perso-
na while she attends school, i.e., the persona of a disabled person
without a service dog."87 Therefore, the district court concluded that
the plaintiff had met the second element of the section 504 claim. 8
The district court found that the plaintiff successfully demon-
strated that the defendants had "failed to make reasonable accommo-
dations to her condition as a disabled person using a service dog."89
While the district court acknowledged that an accommodation is not
reasonable "if it . . . imposes an undue financial or administrative
burden on the grantee, or requires a 'fundamental alteration in the na-
ture of the program,' " the court did not find that the defendants car-
ried that burden.90 The court distinguished the failed defense used by
the Vallejo District from the defense of avoiding a "fundamental alte-
ration in the nature of a program," which was successfully used by
84 id
85 Id.
86 Id. (emphasizing that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act "requires accommodation to
the plaintiffs handicap; it does not require that she accommodate to the views of the public
about her condition").
87 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 958.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 958, 960 (concluding that plaintiff "demonstrated a clear probability of success on
the merits of her federal handicap discrimination claim").
90 Id. at 959 (quoting Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis (Southeastern), 442 U.S. 397, 410. 412
(1979); see also Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
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the defendants in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.91
In Southeastern, the plaintiff was denied admission into the
defendant's nursing program and filed a suit in federal court alleging
a violation of section 504.92 The Court stated that the plaintiff would
be unable to participate in the defendant's nursing program without a
substantial lowering of the program's standards.93 However, the
Court concluded that section 504 "imposes no requirement upon an
educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications
of standards to accommodate a handicapped person," and therefore
found in favor of the defendants.94
Additionally, the Sullivan court pointed out the absurdity of
the defendants' argument that the school did not have to grant access
to the service dog because the plaintiff did not require the use of the
service dog "to attain access to [the] public facility," stating that
"[u]nder this theory, a public facility could ban wheelchairs from its
premises as long as it provided attendants to carry mobility impaired
persons from place to place." 95
The Vallejo District also argued that the rejection of the dog
was justified on two grounds: (1) "the dog [was] unnecessary," and
(2) "space and health concerns." 96 The district court disagreed with
these arguments, stating that the dog served the necessary purpose of
aiding the plaintiff in achieving "greater independence in all aspects
of her life," and further stating that the state legislature determined
that concerns over space and health concerns "may not override the
right of a disabled person who uses a service dog to have full and
equal access to public facilities accompanied by his or her dog."97
While the Vallejo District argued that the plaintiffs IEP required her
to be in a class taught by a teacher with severe allergies to dogs, 98 the
district court concluded that because the plaintiff was a person who
used a service dog as a matter of right under state law, section 504
required the defendants "to develop an IEP which incorporate[d]
plaintiffs choice to use a service dog," and that any failure to do so
91 Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 413. But see Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 959.
92 Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 402.
9 Id. at 413.
94 id
9 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 959 n.11.
96 Id. at 960.
SId.
98 Id.
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would be a "fail[ure] in their obligation to ensure that plaintiff [had]
meaningful access to [the school's] educational program." 99
Finally, the district court determined that "the balance of
hardships tipp[ed] strongly in [the] plaintiffs favor," because the
school district would only have suffered the "minor inconvenience of
having to restructure plaintiffs educational program in order to ac-
commodate her service dog." 00 While the plaintiff was aware that,
due to her teacher's allergies, the use of her service dog was likely to
result in a change to her placement in school, the district court
warned the school district that it was not permitted to "alter plaintiff's
placement to accommodate the purely personal feelings of others . . .
about dogs in the school environment."' 0 1
IV. CAVE V. EAST MEADOW UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT
John Cave, Jr. ("John, Jr.") was a hearing impaired student at
Clark High School in the New York school district of East Meadow
("East Meadow District"). 102 John, Jr. had an IEP that included a
one-on-one sign language interpreter, "individual sessions with a
teacher of the hearing-impaired, a classroom note taker," an FM sys-
tem that worked with his cochlear implants, extended time and sepa-
rate locations for tests, preferential classroom seating, and closed
captioning for video films shown in class.103 In December 2006,
John, Jr. sought the school district's permission to attend school ac-
companied by his service dog, stating that the service dog was an
" 'independent life tool' " that would "increase his independence and
limit the effects of [his] hearing impairment." 04 The East Meadow
District, after holding a section 504 meeting, denied John, Jr.'s re-
quest based upon the section 504 team's determination that John, Jr.'s
IEP already provided him with "full access to the district's special
education program and facilities," and "because he was functioning
satisfactorily" he did not need any additional services. 05
9 Id. (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985)).
'" Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 961.
'o' Id. at 961-62.
102 Cave II, 514 F.3d at 243.
103 Id.; see also Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
'" Cave II, 514 F.3d at 243-44 (internal quotations omitted).
105 Id. at 244. The district court pointed out that, at this meeting, "[s]trangely, there was
no express mention of the request to bring a dog into the high school." Cave I, 480 F. Supp.
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The East Meadow District subsequently held a Committee on
Special Education ("CSE") meeting in which the findings of the sec-
tion 504 meeting were affirmed. 106 Despite these findings by the
school district, in January 2007, John, Jr. attempted to gain access to
school with his service dog, at which time the school officials refused
to grant him access. 0 7 Although John, Jr. was aware of his rights to
appeal the CSE and section 504 team's findings, John, Jr. did not
pursue the administrative appeals process provided by the IDEA, but
instead filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against
the East Meadow District."0 s
The federal suit brought by John, Jr. alleged that the East
Meadow District violated his rights under "the ADA, [s]ection 504,
... § 1983, [and] several New York State statutes," when it refused
to grant John, Jr. and his service dog access to the public school.1 09
Thus, like the plaintiff in Sullivan, John, Jr. did not allege that the
school district violated the IDEA, and therefore John, Jr. argued that
he was not bound by the administrative exhaustion requirement of the
IDEA."o In Sullivan, the court recognized this distinction and em-
phasized that "the substantive rights created by the [IDEA and sec-
tion 504] are distinct," and in some areas, "section 504 creates greater
substantive rights" for the plaintiff." The Sullivan court concluded
that the educational necessity of the service dog was not relevant to
the plaintiff s claim that the "defendants . . . discriminated against her
on the basis of her handicap by arbitrarily refusing her access if she is
accompanied by her service dog."ll 2 However, unlike the court in
Sullivan, the district court in Cave concluded that even though the
plaintiff did not assert a claim under the IDEA, the plaintiffs claim
would be treated as such; therefore, it would be subject to the admin-
istrative remedy exhaustion requirement."' 3 Although the plaintiff in
Cave relied heavily upon the holding in Sullivan, the district court in
Cave provided three reasons why it was not persuaded by the Sulli-
2d at 630.
106 Cave H1, 514 F.3d at 244.
107 Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
'08 Cave II, 514 F.3d at 244; Cave 1, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 626-27.
'0 Cave II, 514 F.3d at 244.
no Id. at 245, 247; Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 951.
" Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 950 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1021 (1984)).
112 Id. at 951.
11 See Cave II, 514 F.3d at 246-49; Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
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van decision." 4
First, the district court in Cave distinguished the plaintiffs in
Cave from those in Sullivan, by finding that while Sullivan needed
"the service dog to increase her physical independence," Cave was
already "quite independent.""' 5 In doing so, however, it appears that
the district court decided for itself the actual extent of John, Jr.'s dis-
ability with complete disregard for the classifications set forth in the
ADA, section 504, and the IDEA.1 6
Second, the district court in Cave found fault with the Sulli-
van court's finding that Sullivan was not bound by the IDEA's ex-
haustion requirement because she did not claim a violation of the
IDEA.1 7 The district court in Cave stated that "the plain language of
the IDEA and [the] Second Circuit case law" require the court to
"look to the nature of the relief that the plaintiffs seek," rather than
the plaintiffs' own characterization of their claim."' Specifically, the
court cited to Polera v. Board of Education of Newburgh Enlarged
School District"'9 and Hope v. Cortines,120 as its precedents. 121 Al-
though both of these cases dealt with the administrative exhaustion
requirement of the IDEA and plaintiffs that did not include an IDEA
charge in their respective complaints, neither case is apposite to
Cave.122 In Polera, the Second Circuit found exhaustion to be re-
quired because the plaintiffs suit was based on the school district's
failure "to provide her with appropriate educational services." 23 in
fact, the plaintiff s complaint included claims under the ADA, section
504, the Fourteenth Amendment, and several state laws, and specifi-
cally alleged that the school failed to provide her with the FAPE, "in-
cluding study materials, compensation for tutoring, and recognition
114 Cave 1, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 637. It is noteworthy that, in affirming the district court's
dismissal of Cave's claim, the Second Circuit relegated its only mention of Sullivan to a
footnote which stated, "[tihe district court also correctly pointed out that Sullivan ... is not
controlling here." Cave H1, 514 F.3d at 248 n.3.
115 Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
"' See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504; 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)
(2000); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3).
" Cave1, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 637-38.
" Id. at 638 (emphasis omitted).
"9 288 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2002).
120 872 F. Supp. 14, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
121 Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
122 See Polera, 288 F.3d at 483; Hope, 872 F. Supp. at 21.
123 Polera, 288 F.3d at 488.
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of academic achievements, to which she was entitled as a disabled
student."1 24 The Polera court held that the simple fact that the plain-
tiff sought "damages, in addition to relief that is available under the
IDEA, [did] not enable her to sidestep the exhaustion requirements of
the IDEA."l 25 The Polera court repeatedly emphasized that the rea-
son for this finding was that the plaintiff was claiming "deficiencies
in .. . her education." 26
In Hope, the plaintiffs brought suit under the ADA, Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act, § 1983, and the Human Rights Law of the
State of New York, alleging that the defendants "unlawfully engaged
in discrimination on the basis of disability and race by . .. refusing to
provide appropriate educational services."' 27 The Hope court pro-
vided a detailed analysis explaining that if the relief sought under a
section 504 or ADA claim is available under the IDEA, exhaustion is
required.128 This conclusion by the court was fatal to the plaintiffs in
Hope precisely because the relief sought was an injunction requiring
the defendants to provide educational services and accommoda-
tions.129
Therefore, by considering Hope and Polera as precedents, the
district court in Cave focused on the fact that the plaintiffs in those
cases sought relief available under the IDEA without including a vi-
olation of the IDEA in their respective complaints. 130 Unfortunately,
the district court in Cave, as well as the Second Circuit on appeal,
failed to acknowledge the fact that the relief sought by the plaintiff in
Cave was not a correction to deficiencies in his education, nor was it
appropriate educational services.131 The plaintiff in Cave, just as the
plaintiff in Sullivan, was seeking to gain access to public school with
a service dog.132 Therefore, Cave is distinguishable from the prece-
dents cited in the district court's opinion in that the plaintiff not only
failed to allege a violation under the IDEA, but he also failed to al-
lege that the school district did not provide him with an FAPE in a
124 Id at 480.
125 Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
126 id
127 Hope, 872 F. Supp. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 21.
129 Id. at 21, 22.
130 Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
13' Cave II, 514 F.3d at 247.
132 See id.; Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 949.
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LRE. 133
Finally, the district court in Cave criticized the Sullivan hold-
ing, stating that the IDEA did not apply based on the Sullivan court's
recognition that "in granting the plaintiffs preliminary injunction,"
the school was ordered "to convene for the purpose of modifying the
plaintiffs existing IEP to ensure that she could be accompanied by
her service dog."1 34 The court in Cave concluded that because the
addition of a service dog would require a modification of the IEP, the
requested change was a form of relief available under the IDEA.135
Thus, the court failed to distinguish between the relief sought and a
possible secondary effect of that relief.
In Cave, the district court added that the court's recognition in
Sullivan that "such a modification of the [plaintiffs] IEP could re-
quire placing the plaintiff at another school," distinguishes Sullivan
from the facts and law in Cave.136 However, this is an intellectually
dishonest reading of the Sullivan decision. Although the Sullivan
court does state that a change in schools could be a possibility, this is
clearly dicta as the paragraph containing that idea begins by stating:
"On the record before me, I cannot determine whether defendants
may be able to accommodate plaintiff and her service dog. ... I
fact, the most significant statement of that passage is the final sen-
tence which states: "In the final analysis, once plaintiffs right to be
accompanied by her service dog is accepted as a given, decisions re-
garding an appropriate placement are educational decisions which are
properly the subject of the [EHA] procedures."1 38 Thus, although the
district court in Sullivan abided by the legislative intent of the
IDEA-leaving educational decisions to those best suited to make
theml 39-and the legislative intent of the ADA-ensuring equal
access to public facilities for people with disabilitiesl40-the Cave
court dismissed the equal access claim based on its conclusion that
access to school is an educational-based activity. 141
13 See Cave II, 514 F.3d at 244.
134 Cave 1, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (citing Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 961, 962).
13 id. at 638.
136 Id. (citing Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 962).
137 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 962.
138 id
139 See generally 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415.
140 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b).
141 See Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 641, 642.
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In its discussion of whether the East Meadow School District
violated the ADA and section 504 by not providing a reasonable ac-
commodation, the Cave court quoted Second Circuit cases and de-
fined " 'reasonable accommodation' as 'one that gives the otherwise
qualified plaintiff with disabilities 'meaningful access' to the pro-
gram or services sought.' "l42 The court clarified this definition by
stating that the defendant "is not required 'to provide every accom-
modation the disabled [person] may request, so long as the accom-
modation provided is reasonable.' "l43 However, although the ADA
does not specifically include the issue of the use of a service animal
as a reasonable accommodation,
the Department of Justice, which promulgated the reg-
ulations enforcing the provisions of the ADA, inter-
preted the ADA to require a place of public accom-
modation to "modify [its] policies, practices, or
procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an
individual with a disability."1 44
The court, reciting the services provided for in John, Jr.'s IEP, con-
cluded that the numerous "accommodations" provided to John, Jr.
"were extraordinary."1 45 The court then conducted a balancing test of
the advantages and disadvantages to allowing access to the plaintiff
and his service dog.146 The court briefly acknowledged that John, Jr.
will have the advantage of being alerted to sounds and alarms, in ad-
dition to having more time to train the service dog, using the phrase
"he will be somewhat assisted."1 47
The court then went on to discuss at length the disadvantages
of granting access to John, Jr. and his service dog, which included:
dog allergies of faculty and students; the need to confine the dog dur-
ing gym class; the possibility of needing to change John, Jr.'s sche-
142 Id. at 640 (quoting Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 282 (2d Cir. 2003)).
143 Cave 1, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (quoting Fink v. N.Y. City Dep't of Pers., 53 F.3d 565,
567 (2d Cir. 1995)) (alteration in original).
144 Beth A. Danon, Emotional Support Animal or Service Animal for ADA and Vermont's
Public Accommodations Law Purposes: Does It Make a Diference?, 32 VT. B.J. 21, 21
(Summer 2006) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(1)) (alteration in original).
145 Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
146 id.
147 id
[Vol. 26754
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/7
RIGHT OF ACCESS
dule; and the need for John, Jr. to leave his classes early.14 8 The court
concluded that the "situation with the service dog is, at best, unclear,
and at worst, detrimental to John, Jr.'s best personal benefit." 49 In
coming to this conclusion, the court intruded into the realm of how to
best educate a child with disabilities, which the IDEA-and the Sulli-
van court-has clearly stated is not the proper role of the court.so
This, however, is not the only problem with the court's balancing act.
First, to state that a school's accommodating for allergies is unrea-
sonable overlooks just how prevalent this issue is in today's socie-
ty.'' Second, the court expressed concern that John, Jr. would lose
out on time in gym class, "apparently one of [his] favorites," because
the dog would be confined elsewhere.152 This statement reveals the
court's lack of understanding and knowledge of the abilities of ser-
vice dogs.
Although there are several different organizations that train
service dogs for the hearing impaired, Canine Companions and Dogs
for the Deaf were the organizations that provided the service dogs for
the plaintiffs in Sullivan and Cave, respectively.153 These organiza-
tions have rigorous training programs for their would-be service dogs
with such high standards that approximately sixty percent of the dogs
that enter the training programs do not graduate. 154 The dogs spend
anywhere from six months to twenty-four months in initial training
before graduating and being placed in a home, and are required to at-
tend follow up training sessions for the lifetime of the placement. 55
In addition to being trained to alert their handler for common sounds,
148 d
149 Id. at 642.
150 See Clark, supra note 45, at 1-2 (noting that Congress intended for disputes over a
child's special education to be resolved first between parents and school administrators be-
fore resort is made to a court); Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 951.
151 See Marie Plicka, Mr. Peanut Goes to Court: Accommodating an Individual's Peanut
Allergy in Schools and Day Care Centers Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 14 J.L.
& HEALTH 87, 88, 104-05 (1999-2000) (discussing methods in which schools may accom-
modate students with allergies).
152 Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
153 See Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 949.
154 Jennie Dapice, Service Dogs and People with Limb Loss, 17 INMOTION 23 (2007),
http://www.amputee-coalition.org/inmotion/mayjun 07/service dogs.pdf.
155 See Canine Companions for Independence, Training and Placement, http://www.cci.
org/site/c.cdKGIRNqEmG/b.4011115/k.644B/Training andPlacement.htm (last visited
Sept. 8, 2009); see also Our Dogs: Dogs for the Deaf, http://www.dogsforthedeaf.org/our
dogs.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
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graduates have the ability to remain stationary, sitting or lying, until
given a command and to refrain from relieving themselves in inap-
propriate locations. 156 Thus, it is hard to imagine that John, Jr. would
lose out on time in his forty-five minute gym class to tend to his ser-
vice dog that would be contained in a collapsible crate.
Third, the possibility of John, Jr.'s schedule being changed is
a factor for John, Jr. and his parents to weigh, not the court. Finally,
the court's concern over the need for John, Jr. to leave his classes ear-
ly, presumably to avoid congestion in the hallway, also reveals a
lack of understanding and knowledge about the world of education on
the court's behalf. Having been an educator in public schools for
over a decade, I have had many students that have needed to leave
class early to avoid congestion in the hallway. In my experience, this
typically occurs when a student is on crutches or has some other med-
ical condition, which her doctor feels is significant enough to avoid
unnecessary contact. However, in John, Jr.'s case, because the ser-
vice dog is a long-term life tool, it would seem counter-productive for
John, Jr. to avoid hallway congestion. That is precisely the type of
situation in which that tool is supposed to aid the disabled handler.15 8
According to Dogs for the Deaf, in addition to the common sounds
the dogs are initially trained to respond to, such as telephones and
smoke alarms, the "[h]earing dogs can be taught to alert people to
any repetitive sound that can be set up and practiced regularly."l 59
However, "[i]f a sound is inconsistent . . . it is hard for the dog to
learn to work it."l 60 This justifies John, Jr.'s assertion that he wants
to bring his service dog to school in order to develop the handler-
service dog bond, and it supports the idea that John, Jr. and his ser-
vice dog should travel the hallways under normal conditions.161
Under this analysis, the district court's balancing in Cave of
156 In fact, these are the minimum standards for an assistance dog in public as set forth by
Assistance Dog International, Inc., the organization which has accredited both Dogs for the
Deaf and Canine Companions. See Assistance Dogs International, Inc., Assistance Dog in
Public Standards, http://www.assistancedogsintemational.org/Standards/Assistance DogPub-
licStandards.php. (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
157 Cave 1, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
158 See id. at 619 (noting that John, Jr.'s service dog was "an independent life tool used to
limit the effects of [his] disability").
159 Dogs for the Deaf: Hearing Dogs, http://www.dogsforthedeaf.org/hearingdogs.php
(last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
160 Id.
161 See, e.g., Cave 1, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
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the advantages and disadvantages of granting access to John, Jr. and
his service dog appears to be flawed. The disadvantages stated by the
court reveal the court's lack of knowledge of the advantages supplied
by service animals, as well as a lack of knowledge of the functioning
of the school environment. While the court emphasized that the
IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirements were intended to
leave the education-based decisions to those most knowledgeable in
that field, the court nonetheless used its limited knowledge of the
functioning of the school environment to refuse to grant a disabled
student access to his school and the choice of how to best live with
his disability.162 Although this choice may not be the first choice of
the school district officials, the district court, or Second Circuit, the
letter and spirit of the disability laws places the priority of such a
choice on the person with the disability.163
CONCLUSION
The last four decades have witnessed great strides in the fight
for equal treatment for American's with disabilities.'"4 While the
federal government has put forth a determined effort to end disabili-
ty-based discrimination, the 2007 decision by the Second Circuit to
affirm the Eastern District Court's dismissal of John Cave, Jr.'s ADA
and section 504 claims threatens to stop the progress Congress has
made in the struggle for equal treatment for all Americans.1 65 What
is most surprising is that these courts used a federal law intended to
guarantee a disabled student an equal education to his non-disabled
peers by stripping that student of his federally guaranteed right of
access to a public building.166 Thus, these courts have decided that it
is more important to ensure equal access to public education by a stu-
dent with a disability than to ensure equal access to a public facility
162 Id. at 636, 637.
161 See id. at 636 (stating that Congress intended for parents and school administrators to
determine the best educational choices for a handicapped child).
16 See Arlene Mayerson, The History of the ADA: A Movement Perspective (1992),
http://www.dredf.org/publications/adahistory.shtml (reviewing the history of disability
rights legislation such as section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act).
165 See Letter from Ed Eames, Ph.D., President, Int'l Ass'n of Assistance Dogs Partners,
to Hon. Edward R. Korman, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E.D.N.Y. (March 24, 2007),
available at http://www.iaadp.org/cave2007.html ("Judge Spatt's decision [w]as a step back
in time.").
166 See generally Id
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by a person with a disability.
However, there is nothing in the legislative history of these
various disability laws that indicates a court should enforce one at the
expense of another. The Sullivan court read the disability statutes as
complementary, and therefore, found that so long as the plaintiffs
claim was not educationally based, the IDEA's administrative ex-
haustion requirement did not apply.' 67 In contrast, the Cave courts
read the disability statutes as exclusionary and found that if the plain-
tiff's claim has even an indirect effect on his education, the IDEA's
administrative exhaustion requirement applies. 168 This strained rea-
soning of the Cave court's decision stands in stark contrast to the
words spoken by Senator Orin Hatch the day of the passage of the
ADA, that "[i]t is time that those in wheelchairs, those who have a
hearing loss or sight impairment, be able to attend the theater or shop
for their own groceries, or participate in the many facets of life which
we in America are so privileged to have at our disposal."l 69 The fact
that there have only been two cases involving students seeking access
to public schools with service dogs may be the result of a hesitation
on the part of Americans with disabilities to utilize this life tool. The
Cave decision, standing as the most recent precedent on this issue,
has affirmed this hesitation to enter the mainstream of American life,
and, indeed, has effectively enabled one disability law to disable
another.
167 Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 951.
168 Cave I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
169 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03, 3 (1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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